sfn (iv) -- neuroethics

reading over my neuroethics post from a little while ago, i realize that failed to make the important distinction between determinism and free will. neuroscience is pointing increasingly to determinism in our behavior -- this makes it unlikely that free will exists in the form that most people think it does (the little man behind the curtain form). listening to dan dennett speak on tuesday reminded me that his little contingent of philosophers does not subscribe to that belief -- they believe instead in a weak form of free will (freedom to make decisions rather than freedom from causality). i disagree with that*: as i said before, i think the responsible way to live is to be fully cognizant that we have no free will in any proper sense of the word, but that we have to live as if we do. dennett does come to a sort of similar conclusion though, borrowing from the old is-ought problem: ethics as distinct and independent from scientific finding. he suggests that law-making should remain political, and that responsibility be a line agreed on by people and not machines, all of which i completely agree with. for the "right" reasons, but also because: people are never going to grasp the ramifications of neuroscientific findings, and "education of the public" is always going to be a pipe dream. this way, we avoid a dictatorship of the intellegentsia, and also, conveniently, satisfy the need to walk the morally correct path. who could ask for anything more?

* conceptually, i think of biological operation and the illusion of free will this way: the brain performs an unconscious computation, and the translation through motor/cognitive pathways that are conscious only comes later, giving us the sense that we performed the action volitionally when really the initiation was just not in our consciousness.